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Necessary fictions: Indigenous claims and the humanity of rights 
 
Indigenous right insistently challenges the surpassing arrogations of sovereign right. In so doing, 
it affirms dimensions of being-together denied or stunted in sovereign modes of political 
formation. This force of Indigenous right is amplified here through legal and literary 
instantiations. These, in turn, uncover the continuously created and fictional quality of rights, 
revealing them to be necessary fictions.  
Keywords: Indigenous rights; Indigenous literatures; law; Mandela; fictions 
How do we stand in that ‘turn’ in the road, that in one direction leads to what is ‘right’ (law, duty, 
obligation, a ‘human rights culture’) and in another direction takes us to literature, writing, 
‘representation’, ‘the culture of mimesis’, the illusion of life? Can these paths be joined? (Bhabha 163-4) 
 
Introduction 
The first and minor literary pretension of this piece will be to follow a not unusual way of 
writing a three act play. The audience is settled into the play with the first act which depicts 
some stable and fairly recognizable scene, but which may also intimate that all is not 
necessarily well. This intimation is often something intrinsic to the stable scene but perhaps, 
just perhaps, profoundly disruptive of it. The second act then deeply disrupts that scene. 
Things fall apart. The third act, frequently set in a different location, puts them together again 
in a new and conclusory configuration. This may still leave us somewhere close to our 
starting point, wiser and a little older.  
Here, then, the first act outlines what is a critique of rights, human rights in particular, 
which critique, if in a way quite set, does remain powerfully pertinent. Whilst summary at 
this stage is especially perilous, it could be said that this is a negative critique, one which 
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counters the more common Panglossian takes on rights and on human rights. Yet there are 
minor characters in this act who behave in resistant, even revolutionary ways – in ways 
strikingly incompatible with the critique, and in ways which would endow rights with 
considerable virtue. Then the second act looks more closely and separably at human rights, at 
the human and at rights. This provides the pin that pricks through the castle wall, disrupting 
both the negative critique and the resistant avowal of human rights. Such disruption, 
however, is not terminal for it leads us to a conception of rights as constituently incorporating 
both these perceptions – the negative critique and the resistant. This orients us to the more 
resolving ethos of the third act. It draws on Indigenous literatures and legal claims, not only 
to provide a stark and monumental instance of negative critique and the denial of rights to 
Indigenous peoples, but also to show that the resistant engagements of Indigenous peoples 
surpass negative rendition. An epilogue focuses finally on what this entails for a modern 
conception of rights, on rights as necessary fictions. 
If there is to be an epilogue, it may be as well to have a prologue also. True to form, this 
prologue will intimate what is to come in the rest of the performance, but its connection to 
what follows will not be laboured.  
Prologue 
The mise-en-scène for the prologue, and a generative location of this paper, is the Ithaca of 
Cornell University as seen through the eyes of Derrida when he delivered a lecture there in 
1983.1 In his “The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils”, Derrida 
later explained the lecture and its topology this way: “The talk’s structure has an essential 
relation with the architecture and site of Cornell: the heights of the hill, the bridge or 
‘barriers’ above a certain abyss..., the common site of so many uneasy discourses on the 
history and rate of suicides” (290). In the lecture proper, he referred to a debate at Cornell 
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over the erection of barriers, “protective railings” on bridges over certain deep chasms (134) 
– barriers inhibiting descent into the abyss beyond. The argument against these barriers, an 
argument invoking death-embracing pronouncements of one of the university’s founders, was 
that the outlook from the university onto the world beyond should be unrestricted. This for 
Derrida becomes something of a metaphor for the imperative of unrestricted, unconditional 
enquiry. Yet for Derrida and for the university there have also to be delimiting barriers, a 
conditioning topographic embedded in the affairs of the world:  
 
Beware of the abysses and the gorges, but also of the bridges and the barriers. Beware of what 
opens the university to the outside and the bottomless, but also of what, closing in on itself, 
...would make the university available to any sort of interest, or else render it perfectly useless. 
(153) 
 
More positively, the university has to combine these death-bound dimensions, the 
unconditional and the conditioned – to bind them in a virtual alternation, yet to do this in a 
way that gives some ultimate force to each without subjecting one to the other. For Derrida, 
this process of alternating and combining went to constitute the forms of life, forms of “what 
lets singular beings...‘live together’” (“Autoimmunity” 130). 
 
Act I: scenes of critique 
It is not to be dismissive of it to say, with a hint of paradox, that the negative critique of rights 
is well established. Indeed, to dismiss such a negative critique here would be contradictory 
since it will also be adopted. Relying initially on Elizabeth Anker’s vivified rendition of the 
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classic critique of human rights in her engagement with Coetzee’s Disgrace, and in bald 
summary, we find that Disgrace engenders openings to social justice, openings which offer 
“a pointed rebuke to prevailing accounts of human rights”, and we find that they do so by 
exposing “human rights to be indebted to an individualist logic” (“Human Rights” 243). All 
of which entails a complicit acceptance of “dominant Western legal and philosophical 
conceptions of individuality” (243). Thence, human rights fail “to account for notions of 
responsibility and interdependence” (251), for “unconditional” ties (253). Furthermore, 
human rights, being “a legal construct” (243) and like the law generally, are found to be 
rigidly determinate – “unyielding, absolute, and authoritarian” (259). In a like vein, they are 
also found to be saturated with the “legally codified...violence and oppressions of apartheid” 
(241). And ominously for present purposes, Anker further observes of the postapartheid 
nation that “the status of human rights in South Africa has often been read to betoken a 
prognosis for the global future of the human rights paradigm” (234). The encompassing 
frame here remains, however, one of national sovereign assertion – a force often decreed to 
be essential for rights and human rights to be effective (e.g. Arendt chapter 9).2  
Moving on now to this wider terrain, Anker’s searing engagement resonates with many 
critiques set in international and even global terms. Pheng Cheah’s is one that is much noted 
and will be briefly instanced here as a prelude to the more moderated critique to be derived 
from him in the second act. What is of pointed and present significance is his equating the 
putatively universal in human rights with their “particular site of emergence”, whether that 
emergence is from the “economically hegemonic North”, or from Southern NGOs, or Asian 
governments (Inhuman Conditions 152, 159). Other claims can be more explicitly 
encompassing, such as those made in the names of global capital and biopower (see Bailey). 
All of which, in Upendra Baxi’s rendition, is a typifying of human rights as unitary, even as 
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monist, and at least “paradigm”, and as such this conception of human rights can assume a 
“dominant or hegemonic” position (xv, 23, 206).  
Supporting instances these days appear numberless. So, we have the claims of a certain 
imperium to some prime purchase on human rights, claims which do not sit well with the 
operative inhibition on the ratification by the United States of international conventions on 
human rights. As well as being a proprietal adornment of such documents as the National 
Security Strategy, human rights are given some direct force by the United States through 
being made conditions of trade and aid. Overlapping these efforts, and probably more 
extensive and certainly more tentacular, there is the insistence on human rights by various 
international organizations in programmes of “structural adjustment” and “poverty reduction 
strategies”. It is difficult to be at all exact about what would now seem to be the enormous 
resources devoted to all of this because provision for “promoting” human rights tends to be 
mixed in budgets of, for example, the World Bank, the IMF and the US Agency for 
International Development, with accompanying imperatives to do with promoting 
democracy, and the rule of law, and with pursuing “the war on terror”. These and other like 
endeavours, such as “The Nine Principles” guiding “The Global Compact” for co-operation 
between the United Nations and “the private sector”, are focussed on the promotion of market 
relations and neo-liberal orthodoxy. Going in another, or perhaps the same, direction we have 
the linking of human rights with war, sometimes by way of “humanitarian intervention” – the 
Gulf War, one and two, the conflict over Kosovo, and the war in Afghanistan, all often 
dubbed wars for human rights and all instances of Gore Vidal’s neo-Kantian squib, 
“perpetual war for perpetual peace” (title page).3 
In a stark contrast, both the negative critique and the hegemonic utility of human rights are 
disturbed by Baxi’s evocation of another human rights, human rights as plurality, a plurality 
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in which “human rights enunciations proliferate, becoming as specific as the networks from 
which they arise and, in turn, sustain”, networks embedded in “communities of resistance” 
(26, 47, 144). Human rights of this kind exist along with the “hegemonic” human rights but 
can never be “fully” dominated by them (23). To take but two instances: one comes from the 
degradation of detention camps set up by the Australian government in remote locations to 
hold refugees, asylum seekers, and illegal immigrants, so-called. Spectacular resistances 
within the camps allied with legal action reliant on human rights led in July 2009 to a radical 
reversal of government policy and practise. (Bailey). The other instance comes from the 
Womens’ Courts in and around Delhi, the Mahila Panchayats. These are courts established by 
women quite outside of the formal legal system. Typically, proceedings are taken against 
men for domestic violence or for maintenance. As well as drawing on “local idiom”, there is 
a general reliance on “equitable notions of jurisprudence and women’s rights” (Magar 44, 
55), and that reliance extends to the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, a convention characteristically described as a bill of rights 
for women.  
In all, this first act ends with some apt unease, with at least a touch of irresolution, with 
some intimation of a divide that could prove to be intrinsically disruptive. 
 
Act II: dissolution 
The dissolution which should now ensue in the second act hardly looks likely if its focal 
concern is going to be law, which it is. Law, after all, is supposed to provide us with some 
security of expectation, some stability in an unstable world, some reliable determinacy. Law 
of this kind is commonly considered to reach its apotheosis in the modern “rule of law”. As 
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with law, so with that artefact of law, rights. To make a claim of right, what you are claiming 
has to have some determinate existence.  
And yet law, modern law, has (also) to be the opposite of all that. If law ceased to be 
responsive to the ever-changing conditions of being-together in and as its community, it 
would progressively cease to rule a situation changing around it. At least, this would be the 
fate of modern law, for such law can no longer resolve the divide between its determinate 
existence and its responsiveness by way of a transcendent reference, by way of sovereign 
divine right for instance. In terms of Derrida’s Cornellian topography, there have to be both 
the containing barriers of determinacy and the abyssal openness of the responsive. An 
ultimate commitment to either is death – death by way of stasis or death by way of 
dissipation. These two dimensions fuse yet remain distinct in an aporetic generation of a form 
of being-together, of law. 
As the abyssal may suggest, dissolution goes further yet. A correlate of law’s illimitable 
responsiveness is that it can have no enduring content of its own. It is a vacuity. “Law itself”, 
says Nancy, “does not have a form for what would need to be its own sovereignty” (Being 
Singular 131). Law depends upon a power apart from it for determination, for its enforceable 
determinacy. Not that all this makes law’s responsive dimension ultimately dependent on the 
determinate. With law’s illimitable responsiveness, with its unconditionality, it can never be 
contained, never be subjected to a conditioned determinacy, and such determinacy would 
include a site of sovereignty. Law thence remains ever open to appropriation by any site of 
power, by a plurality – returning to Baxi’s perception of human rights (47, 144).  
We are left for now with law as a contained and subjected determinacy, yet also as 
uncontained and illimitable. The crux and the focal illustration of this seeming paradox 
comes now, with Derrida’s help, from Mandela in the struggle against apartheid (Derrida 
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“Laws of Reflection”; Mandela). The contrasts could hardly be more stark. Mandela’s intense 
commitment to various affirmations of human rights existed along with the apartheid 
regime’s subscribing to many such affirmations, whilst denying their application to the bulk 
of the population (Derrida “Laws of Reflection” 16-17, 36; Mandela 199-206). As for the 
law, Mandela was among its most trenchant critics. This was a law he saw as constituently 
compromised in its subordination to a dominant power in general and to the exclusionary 
regime of apartheid in particular (e.g. Mandela 309). That much would occasion no surprise. 
Yet there is a seemingly other Nelson Mandela, one who, in the very midst of his acute 
perception of the legal oppressions of the apartheid regime, sees another law, a rule of law in 
accordance with which the courts even within that regime can provide fairness (308). 
Mandela advances a conception of professional duty which operatively respects and admires 
both the law and its judicial institution, even as the pervasive legal oppressions of apartheid 
are being brought to bear on him. The law which calls forth this magnanimous regard is the 
law which can always extend beyond its determinate existence, the law that integrally and 
responsively orients that existence in the law’s ordinary course towards the possibility of its 
being otherwise, and towards a corresponding possibility of its inclusive and equal extension 
to all groups in South Africa – towards a more inclusively whole South African people 
(Derrida “Laws of Reflection” 19-21). 
That conjunction is key. Along with Derrida’s emphasis, Mandela characteristically 
invokes the inclusive “we” of the people “when he asks the question of the subject 
responsible before the law” (Derrida “Laws of Reflection” 26). Mandela would equate “all 
the people” with “the subjects of the law” (21). True, the founding of a national people entails 
a “coup de force”, entails the violent affirmation of some sovereign determinacy (17-18). Yet 
for its law to be “established”, the “fiction” of “the unity” of the nation must be 
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“presupposed” in “this violent act” (17-18). But with apartheid and South Africa, the 
supposed founding of a nation “remained a coup de force, thus, as a bad coup” (18 – his 
emphasis).4 Along with this remaining there was the persistent “failure” of a putative law 
that, in its primal exclusions, “never managed to establish itself” (18). What apartheid failed 
to effect was what Derrida has described elsewhere as “a law of originary sociability” 
(Friendship 231), a law that generates the “laws”, that produces the “visibility” of the laws 
(“Laws of Reflection” 34, 38). Such law in its very responsiveness is of the laws, intrinsic to 
law as it is. Law, to be law, cannot ultimately be subordinated in some determinate presence. 
So also with rights. Rights are normative claims on the futurity of a being-together in 
community. As such, a right has always to be able to transcend any delimitation, always able 
to become other than what it may presently be. A right, that is, generatively trajects beyond 
any contained condition, whether temporally or spatially contained. That uncontainment is 
the impelling element of a right’s being “general and universal”, of its surpassing any 
specificity. That standard formulation will reappear in the next act. 
The human, the humanity of rights, thoroughly embeds this responsiveness of rights. 
Coming from within the secular human, the posited community of the human, we are not able 
to occupy some comprehension beyond it, to encompass and contain it – to decree what its 
“nature”, including its human nature, may “universally” be. Such humanity, to adapt Nancy, 
is “not subject to any authority; it does not have a sovereign” (Being Singular, 185). And to 
echo Derrida, humanity is always and ever “to come” (e.g. “Force of Law” 256).  
A return to Pheng Cheah’s much noted concern with human rights can provide an engaged 
focussing of these points (Inhuman Conditions). His perspective on human rights would 
accord with both their negative critique and with the confirmation of that critique offered 
earlier when identifying the vacuous susceptibility of rights to appropriation. So, and for 
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example, he finds human rights bound “to the instrumentalization of human relations” and 
thence “rooted in the very nature of economic development within the structure of capitalist 
accumulation” (259). There is much else cogently in that vein. Yet Pheng Cheah also finds 
that human rights can extend beyond this delimited existence and “enable...the actualization 
of humanity” (265). He is also inclined, along with Derrida, to affirm the “unconditional 
normativity” of human rights (174). Yet there is point to Anker’s view that “[f]or Cheah, 
there is no outside to the force field of global capital” (“Contaminations” 2). And even if this 
“force field” for Cheah may not be a totality, it would seem nonetheless to have a totalizing 
ability (176). In other words, in going beyond their existent determinacy, human rights would 
still be committed to return to the encompassing “force field” of this hegemonic 
determination. Yet Cheah also provides the salutary corrective. Where he engages with 
democracy, the purposive object of course of numerous human rights, in his “The Untimely 
Secret of Democracy”, Pheng Cheah fulsomely accommodates the unconditional in and as 
democracy (78), accommodates its “constitutive exposure to the wholly other” (79), 
accommodates its “incalculable” quality (85). 
In sum, the parting position at the end of this second act is that rights constituently and 
inseparably entail both their conditioned appropriation within containing barriers, as the 
negative critique so poignantly reveals, and the ability to go unconditionally, illimitably 
beyond any such appropriation into the realm of the abyssal. Moving now without 
intermission to the third act, the effort there will be to show existently how this containment 
and this unconditionality combine into and as rights, to the effect that rights, still granted 
Anker’s critique, may yet “account for [those] notions of responsibility and 
interdependence”, for those “unconditional ties”, they are said to counter so affirmatively 
(“Human Rights” 253). Or, in Mandela’s terms, the effort will be to show existently how 
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rights as an artefact of law are integral to the being-together of a people. The opening scene is 
not propitious. 
 
Act III: resolution 
This opening scene tells an old story but a story not often enough told. The oppression and 
dispossession of Indigenous peoples in both the assertion and denial of rights matches a 
genealogy of human rights that can be traced back through natural rights and thence to 
natural law (Fitzpatrick “Latin Roots”). This particular grand narrative is joined here at a 
fairly late stage in 1823 with the case of Johnson v M’Intosh decided by the Supreme Court 
of the United States. For a great many national legal systems, this decision remains what the 
lawyers would call “a leading case” by virtue of its being a formative legal authority on 
Indigenous rights (e.g. Bartlett 182-3). This is an elevation freighted with obvious irony since 
the case deprived Indigenous people of their rights.  
Continuing in an ironic vein, some nuance has to be brought to that abrupt conclusion. The 
judgment in that case invariably invoked when referring to it as authority is that of Chief 
Justice Marshall. In that judgement we find that, with some regard perhaps to a recent 
revolution based on universal or natural rights or on the rights of all “men”, Marshall did 
recognize that Indian peoples had “natural rights” in their land, including the right to transfer 
ownership (563). To deny them that right, which the case did, was for Marshall indefensible, 
but “may, we think, find some excuse, if not justification, in the character and habits of the 
people whose rights have been wrested from them” (588). It may not be incidental to add that 
to have done otherwise could well have proved disastrous for the fledgling union of the 
United States (Williams 231, 306-8). But returning to Marshall and to the lamentable 
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character and habits of Indian peoples, what these amounted to was “the condition of a people 
with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a distinct entity” 
(590). This indefinite mixture of separation and subordination has of course endured ever 
since. To drive the point home, Marshall next resorted to Realpolitik:  
 
However this restriction [on a right of property] may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages 
of civilized nations, yet if it be indispensable to that system under which the country has been 
settled, and be adapted to the actual condition of the two people, it may perhaps be supported by 
reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice. (591-2) 
 
Even more pointedly the court had to go along with the sovereign “government” since it was 
this government that “has given us...the rule for our decision” (572).  
   Yet even this elevation of a surpassing power of government over law could not quite end 
matters because in one vital respect “the rule for our decision” was dubious. Marshall found 
that the colonial appropriation of the land was legitimate on what was then a standard legal 
ground used to found imperial settlement, that of “discovery”. Yet in the later case of 
Worcester v Georgia decided in 1832 Marshall found it  
 
...difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could 
have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they 
occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in the 
country discovered which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors. (542-3) 
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Marshall had no further regard to that particular “difficulty” but it, and variations of it, have 
given pause to courts in other settler states. For example, with Mabo v The State of 
Queensland (No.2) decided by the High Court of Australia in 1992, the realization that 
settlement was based on a legally invalid ground impelled the court to declare that this was 
simply a matter that should not be enquired into (31). 
This could hardly provide a less promising prospect for the cases brought of late by 
Indigenous peoples to affirm their rights, and their human rights – cases where they have 
relied on law’s responsiveness, no matter how attenuated that responsiveness may become 
when filtered through sovereign arrogations. As the Mabo case has just intimated, these 
actions have fittingly and radically unsettled a self-sufficing sovereignty. The assertion of 
rights founded in Indigenous being-together presents, to borrow the phrase, a clear and 
present danger to sovereign settlement. Repeating somewhat, rights are normative claims on 
the illimitable futurity of a being-together in community. Hence a constituent imperative of 
rights, of being-in-right, is the autonomy of that being – a stark counter to an all-surpassing 
sovereignty that would seek to limit them. The reaction of the courts to this challenge has 
been revealing, the Canadian cases especially so.  
In R v Van der Peet decided in 1996, Chief Justice Lamer in the Canadian Supreme Court 
cautioned, with emphasis, that the rights being claimed by the Indigenous group in that case 
“are aboriginal”, and this “aboriginality” meant that the “rights cannot...be defined on the 
basis of philosophical precepts of the liberal enlightenment”, on the basis of their being 
“general and universal” (paras 17-18). This generality and universality are decidedly not of 
the kind associated earlier with the illimitable responsiveness of rights. Indeed, and in 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia, the Canadian Supreme Court held in 1997 that aboriginal 
title to land existed and entered into existence, and into contention,S only because it had 
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“crystallized at the time [colonial] sovereignty was asserted” (para. 145). That sovereign 
claim is of the standard, quasi-transcendent variety, a claim for sovereign power being able to 
subsist finitely yet encompass the general and the universal within its determinate existence.  
This in itself is not sufficient definitively to counter the challenge of right since a right 
itself is illimitable. The right must then be limited. The “crystallized” right has to retain its 
originating hardness; or, in the widely used colonial idiom, the rights are “frozen” (Van der 
Peet paras 165, 170, 172). Rights of this kind are so specifically tied to temporal and spatial 
determinants that they can be proved as a matter of “fact”, and so integrally tied that if the 
determinants changed the rights disappear. Such rights, that is, cannot be creatively oriented 
beyond an unchanging determinate existence. Since this generative orientation beyond is 
necessary for being-in-right, the rights so “recognized” (the standard term) are not rights at 
all. More starkly, this is a domain of non-being – either a stasis that denies being, denies the 
motility of being, or a dissipation, an unfreezing, that denies existence to being. In the 
Cornellian topography this amounts to either an unchanging containment within barriers or a 
fall into the abyss. 
To illustrate this farrago more concretely, one of its more egregious contributions could be 
taken, the case of Mashpee Tribe v Town of Mashpee. This was a decision by a Federal 
District Court of the United States in 1978, and it was obliquely affirmed by the Supreme 
Court. It involved an action brought by the Indian community at Mashpee on Cape Cod to 
recover land. To succeed the Mashpee had to establish that they were a “tribe” in terms of the 
relevant legislation. Despite an abundance of evidence showing that the Mashpee as a 
community had persisted for upwards of three hundred years, they failed to establish that they 
were a “tribe”. This is because in crucial respects the Mashpee failed to meet the criteria of 
“tribal” identity fixed in the legislation. Their most lamentable failure lay in being a generous 
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and a gregarious people who welcomed into their midst and inter-married with a diversity of 
others, with settlers, deserters from the mercenary ranks of the British Army in the 
revolutionary war, and runaway slaves. Because these people coming in were not sufficiently 
subordinated to an enduringly set identity, because the responsive regard to their presence at 
times altered some supposed original identity of the community, the Mashpee failed to show 
that they had sustained an invariant identity, and so their claim to the land failed.  
If we are dealing with a relation here, if we are dealing even with the recognition so-called 
of Indigenous peoples and their rights, then this is a relation and a process of recognition 
lopsided to the point of absurdity. In short, is it a relation in which one side can not only 
influence but also determine what the other is, something that this “other” cannot do, 
reciprocally or otherwise. Indigenous peoples thence remain “encapsulated societies”, to 
borrow the term from Geertz (3). 
Moving now towards an inversion of this monist “recognition” by way of Indigenous 
literature, the Indian protagonist, Abel, in Scott Momaday’s House Made of Dawn observes 
of his trial for murder: “Word by word by word these men were disposing of him in language, 
their language, and they were making a bad job of it. They were strangely uneasy, full of 
hesitation, reluctance” (95 – original emphasis). The hesitation, the reluctance, the “bad job”, 
the bad coup, emanate from the precipitate reduction of Abel’s case, from the blocking of an 
informed responsiveness to him, and to his case. No such hesitation or reluctance 
characterizes the trial in Sherman Alexie’s The Lone Ranger and Tonto Fistfight in Heaven. 
Here the accused, Thomas Builds-the-Fire, asserts his own narrative, and asserts it aptly in 
court, and in so doing rouses the support of his people (cf. Mandela 384-5). The court in its 
peremptory positioning can accommodate neither the narrative nor the people and is driven to 
violence and obscenity to assert its own encapsulated reality (93-103).  
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So much, in terms of the Cornellian typography, for the barriers. What of the abyss? The 
attempt here will be to follow the kind of process mapped out by José Rabasa, the process in 
which “the philosophical and political tradition of the West would be considered in 
indigenous terms” (197). This will not, cannot, be done by resorting to “indigenous terms” 
perceived in some assuredly “authentic” way (cf. Kuper).5 The terms here will be clearly 
consonant with the shreds of the philosophical and the political drawn on so far. And what 
generates these terms here is the literary quality of Indigenous literature, an abyssal literary 
quality of illimitable receptivity: the poet, says Rilke, is “he or she who is ready for 
everything” (see Fenton 248). Or, evoking the other generative placing of this paper in 
Portsmouth,6 there is the boundless possibility of being sensed by Nietzsche when facing the 
openness of the sea (e.g. Gay Science 199 [343]; Zarathustra 65 “On the Blessed Isles”). 
What in this light is most telling about the Deep Rivers of José Mariá Arguedas can be 
found concentrated in the first chapter set in Cusco, once the capital of the Inca Empire. In a 
sense, what embeds the whole novel here are the stones, the stones of what were once Inca 
buildings and walls in Cusco but which have now been built on by the colonists. The stones 
are both foundational of yet subordinated to imperial structures. Yet the same stones are 
radiant. They seethe, they move, talk, frolic. Their streets flow like rivers, deep rivers, rivers 
akin to primordial serpents. This foundational fusion with movement and change is later 
aligned in the novel with Indigenous rebellions, with a primal or abyssal capacity to sweep 
away the existent, to sweep it away in a flood, a flood of rivers (chapters 7 and 11).  
Given world enough and time, these same motifs of rivers and serpents, these same forces 
it would seem, can be found abundant in Alexis Wright’s Carpenteria, set in northern 
Australia. Here such forces are concentrated in the Law, in an Aboriginal conception of the 
Law (e.g. 2). This, reverting to Rabasa’s appropriation of philosophy “considered in 
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Indigenous terms” (197), and returning also to Derrida specifically, would be a “law of 
originary sociability” (Politics of Friendship 231). And it is these forces which, in the novel’s 
culmination, regeneratively sweep away in a cyclonic flood the artefacts of imperial 
exploitation along with its operatives, the “Law-breakers” (404).  
 
Epilogue: the paths converge 
In Roman law the legal fiction served to accommodate change in the law whilst that law 
remained evidently the same. So, to make some claims in law you had to be a Roman citizen, 
but eventually for this purpose foreigners were simply deemed to be citizens whilst “the letter 
of the law” remained unchanged (Maine 21-2). Somewhat more expansively, Derrida would 
see the law, the determinate law, as “fictional”, as “artifice” (“Force of Law” 240). For 
Derrida, “narrativity and fiction” inhabit “the very core of legal thought” (“Before the Law” 
190). With Nancy’s “juris-fiction” the law is that which is “modelled or sculpted (fictum) in 
terms of right”, with right having constituently to combine the abyssal “unforeseen” with a 
posited determinacy (Finite Thinking 156-7). The persistence of Indigenous claims through 
law and right may yet lend further transforming force to the realization of law as fiction, the 
realization of its constantly created quality. Fiction here, as Thomas Docherty would have it, 
“is strategic lying – but, importantly, the strategic goal is not deception but rather the 
establishment of the faith, trusts, and friendships that we call ‘community’, a commonality of 
sense” (113-14). The law embodying that commonality of sense, and drawing one last time 
on Derrida’s “reflecting” Nelson Mandela, would be “a law that has not yet presented itself in 
the West, at the Western border, except briefly, before immediately disappearing” (“Laws of 
Reflection” 38).  
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Notes 
1. See Acknowledgements for the detail. 
2. The present paper will remain focussed in this frame and challenge it from within, as it were. This is not to 
ignore the now extensive international enforceability of human rights (see Steiner, Alston and Goodman, 
chapters 8-10). That this enforceability is of fairly recent vintage excuses Arendt (cf. Agamben 126-7). 
3. These and other like uses of human rights are considered in Fitzpatrick “Terminal Legality”. 
4. The terms continue to be taken from Derrida here. Fully fledged apartheid was not introduced until 1948. 
That could be seen as a re-founding but, in any case, the founding is not simply an isolated coup “back then” 
but a continuing “performative act” (cf. Derrida “Laws of Reflection” 18 – his emphasis). 
5. This disavowel may also help avoid the controversy over whether the author about to be invoked, José Mariá 
Arguedas, is authentically indigenous (Murra ix-xiii). 
6. See Acknowledgements for the detail. 
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